

Structure of CIA

TWENTY: HOW CIA HAS THWARTED OVERSIGHT: THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES TRIUMPHANT

"I never had any thought that when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations."

Former President Harry S. Truman, a month after the assassination of President Kennedy

The greater the power CIA accrued, the more convoluted and labyrinthine a bureaucratic structure it devised for itself, the easier it was to avoid accountability to Congress. Over the years, systematically and repeatedly Congress defaulted in its responsibility to bring oversight to CIA operations. That the public over time was emboldened to ask fewer questions of CIA represented a triumph of CIA's influence over the media, mainstream and otherwise. When confronted directly, CIA was practiced at obfuscation, evasion and lying, strategies of which Allen Dulles and James Angleton had been past masters.

Oversight + Church Committee (after Hunt)

True, but try a different phrase

There were, of course, people who did notice and oppose CIA's rise to power. One was former President Harry S. Truman. Eight days after the Kennedy murder, Truman reached for his pen and began the draft for the editorial he would publish on the front page of the "Washington Post" on December 22nd, the one month anniversary of the assassination.

Truman was silent. But after Kennedy's murder

In "U.S. Should Hold CIA To Intelligence Role," an outright attack on CIA's policy-making and illegal activities, Truman complains that CIA had been operating a government of its own, usurping the one elected by the citizenry.

Disingenuously choosing to forget George Kennan's Dulles-inspired 10/2 National Security directive authorizing CIA to commit murder most foul, Truman insists that he believed that CIA's sole function was "the most

accurate and up-to-the-minute information on what was going on everywhere in the world." He had never intended, Truman wrote in 1963, nearly two decades after the fact, that CIA inject itself into "peacetime cloak and dagger operations." ✓

Truman is bitter as he accuses CIA of casting "a shadow over our historic position." CIA, as Congressman Ron Paul would insist in 2010, was "in urgent need of correction." CIA's "operational duties," Truman wrote, should "be terminated or properly used elsewhere." CIA's influence over the "Washington Post" was sufficient for the article to be pulled from the later editions of the "Post" that day. ✓

Others in the media censored themselves, so that Truman's extraordinarily bold editorial is not even mentioned in David McCullough's exhaustive and well-received biography of Truman published forty years later. ✱
Researcher Ray Marcus, who discovered that the editorial had vanished from the afternoon "Post" editions, concluded that "implicitly and obliquely, Truman was suggesting at least possible [CIA] culpability in the killing of Present Kennedy."

Only Richard Starnes, who had exposed CIA skullduggery in South Vietnam, had the courage to applaud President Truman's article. Despite CIA pressure, still employed by Scripps Howard, Starnes wrote in the New York "World-Telegram" that "for writing the same thing [as President Truman] from South Viet Nam last fall, this reporter was (and still is) subjected to a calculated behind-the-scenes campaign of opprobrium at the hands of the CIA." ✓

Afterward, Truman remarked to his friend Admiral Sidney W. Souers, whom he had appointed interim first Director of Central Intelligence: "It

[CIA] is certainly a different animal than I tried to set up for you." Souers too was bitter. Noting how Richard Helms as DD/P was conducting the business of undeclared war, Souers said dryly, "It is my understanding that he has never worn a uniform."

CIA "was not intended to operate as an international agency engaged in strange activities," Truman told "Look" magazine. ✓

Having been fired by President Kennedy did not prevent Allen Dulles from continuing as the preeminent influence at CIA. As soon as he read Truman's article, dangerous if only because it might well provoke unpleasant interest and oversight of CIA, Dulles mobilized his forces. He wrote to Clark Clifford, now chairman of Lyndon Johnson's Intelligence Advisory Board. He solicited indignant letters-to-the-editor from CIA assets in academe.

Then Dulles zeroed in on Truman. On January 7, he wrote Truman a five-page single-spaced letter. He was "deeply disturbed" by the suggestion that CIA's operational duties be terminated, Dulles said. It was, Dulles the lawyer rightly pointed out to Truman, "National Security Council action" that had approved "a new office to carry out covert operations directed against secret Communist subversion." ✓

Apparent, of course, is Dulles sleight-of-hand: CIA had been created BEFORE the National Security Council directives authorizing its illegal covert operations. CIA had been involved in assassinations and other terrorist activities in Italy before 10/2, and 10/2 had been written in part to justify already existing CIA black operations like GLADIO.

Dulles was brazen enough even to invoke President Kennedy, who in response to Arthur Krock's calling CIA "a malignancy on the body politic" and likely to engineer a coup, had defended CIA. Hadn't Kennedy declared at an October 9, 1963 press conference that he could find "nothing to indicate that the CIA had done anything but support policy"? That Kennedy believed no such thing has been documented widely, whatever he told the press that day.

Dulles bided his time for three months. Then, on April 7th, he announced his presence in Independence, Missouri, where he just happened to be passing through. He carried with him a memorandum entitled "Constitutional and Legal Basis for So-Called Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency."

In a further example of CIA dishonesty, this memo equates the powers of CIA with those of the elected government. Hadn't James Knox Polk in his invasion of Mexico entered "lands owned by a foreign nation with which the United States was at peace"? If Polk could violate the law, why not CIA? *Sort of external? Manifest destiny?*

In the years to come, CIA, not quite ready to announce that it had engineered a coup, would induce presidents to authorize its illegal war policies after the fact. In the early 1980s, CIA sought President Reagan's endorsement of Iran Contra. In the new century, CIA would have Barack Obama endorse its war in Pakistan. The only president who refused to comply had been John F. Kennedy.

The CIA memo brought to Truman to justify its paramilitary and military operations, is riddled with further sophistry. It insists that while there was "no specific statutory authorization to any agency to conduct covert war activities," neither was there "any statutory prohibition." Congress had "repeatedly

appropriated funds for the support of such activities as black propaganda, commando-type raids, sabotage and guerrilla activities," CIA reminded Truman. These "did not require as a basis for [their] exercise an act of Congress."

Confident that he had won the argument, Dulles ordered Truman to destroy this document. Then Dulles told Lawrence Houston that Truman was likely to "consult with those, whoever they are, who induced him to make the original statement." A habitual conspirator, Dulles could not imagine that Truman had thought up this attack on CIA all by himself. Back home, Dulles suggested to Houston that he urge new CIA director John McCone to send Truman a message on his approaching 80th birthday as a gesture of CIA's continuing friendship.

Truman continued his opposition to the monster CIA had become. He had wanted "no Gestapo," Truman repeated in his memoirs. "I think it was a mistake," he reiterated to his biographer, Merle Miller. "And if I'd known what was going to happen, I never would have done it." CIA had "got out of hand."

"They've got an organization over there in Virginia now that is practically the equal of the Pentagon in many ways," Truman said, still underestimating the problem. "One Pentagon is too many." He did not foresee how seamlessly the Pentagon would make itself available to CIA policies. "Those fellows in the CIA don't just report on war," Truman said. "They go out and make their own," and this, indeed was prescient. By the 2000s, CIA was waging its private war in Pakistan.

The aging President saw what few would have the courage to articulate in the years to come. CIA had become "a very dangerous thing in a

democratic society.” Nor would his recommendation meet with approval by elected officials. “It’s got to be put a stop to,” Truman knew. “Secrecy and a free, democratic government don’t mix.”

He had long known that you had to “keep your eye on the military at all times, and it doesn’t matter whether it’s the birds in the Pentagon or the birds in the CIA.” He declared emphatically that he believed in the people’s “right to know what those birds are up to.”

II

CIA had never been without defenses against the occasional encroachments of elected officials. CIA had long moved behind a Byzantine structure of interlocking components. The clandestine services were, by the turn of the 1960’s at the latest, exempt not only from outside scrutiny, but from internal Agency oversight and review procedures.

Beginning in 1952, the Directorate for Intelligence and the Directorate for Plans (DD/P) functioned as separate organizations. The funds destined for clandestine operations were unvouchered, as were the salaries of clandestine officers. You couldn’t follow the money as a means of penetrating Agency operations. Division chiefs controlled their own funds, from which they could finance “hip pocket operations” that were disclosed only to the DD/P.

JMWAVE alone boasted: a Support Branch; an Operations branch; a Covert Action Branch; an External Operations Branch that was responsible for collecting HUMINT (Human Intelligence) on a target country; a

Report section; a Technical Services Section; and Communicators, responsible for maintaining secure communications between JMWAVE and Headquarters.

The ~~DD/P~~, the clandestine services, alone presided over fifteen components. Part of the clandestine services as well was a Special Activities Staff (SAS) responsible to the Deputy Director for Plans. Between 1962 and 1965 this was Richard Helms.

To further compartmentalize, in 1964, CIA created a new branch, the Domestic Operations Division (DOD) to centralize "responsibility for the direction, support, and coordination of clandestine operational activities within the United States." Hesitation about CIA operating domestically was a distant memory.

Within the Agency, there was one additional and all but separate organization. This was the Office of Security, which ^{routinely} shared information with only one other component, CI/SIG (Counter Intelligence, Special Investigation Group). The task of the Office of Security was to protect the Agency from within and without. If someone requested a document, and it was deemed "missing," chances were that it was being withheld by the Office of Security. The Office of Security was immune to requests either from members of Congress or congressional committees – or, later, nosy citizens later filing freedom of information lawsuits. *ND*

There were copious Office of Security files on writers and businessmen, like "Daniel Schlumberger" of the Houston-based well-drilling company. Schlumberger enjoyed four Office of Security file designations: "Daniel Schlumberger"; "Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp"; "Schlumberger Limited"; and "Schlumberger Co."

✓

*the OS also reversed
the process*

One handwritten sheet, inadvertently released under the JFK Act, refers to Office of Security "sensitive documents which were pulled from O.S. files" prior to their being reviewed by Frank Church's Senate Select committee. One, not surprisingly, was the "Oswald File" from the Office of Security's "Vol. II." It contained documents beginning in April 1959, prior to Oswald's departure for the Soviet Union. *[Vol 5 of LHO of Ric is missing]*

Another group of documents denied to the Senate committee were four sets of records, from "Vol. VI," having to do with a man named Jack Martin (or "John G. Martin," or "Joseph James Martin"), who first brought the relationship between Lee Harvey Oswald and CIA contract pilot David Ferrie to the notice of New Orleans law enforcement.

Paul Gaynor
For years, ~~Bruce Solie~~ ran the Office of Security, developing power parallel to that of the Director of Central Intelligence. In the late 1970's, when the House Select Committee on Assassinations requested files from the Office of Security for review, Solie sent a "MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD" to his staff. Office of Security personnel must not disturb the files marked "not having viewed" by the House Committee staff members, Solie wrote, in order that they "maintain the integrity of the envelopes."

It was the Office of Security that assigned to CIA's assets, employees or contacts either an AINS (Agency Identification Number) or an EINS (Employee Identification Number). AINS were internal CIA file subject identification numbers, "not necessarily suggesting an "employee relationship," although some employees

enjoyed "AINS" designations. On the list of "AINS" listed in the CIA security files
0/S File # 758
was George de Mohrenschildt, who was at least a CIA asset, if not an "employee."

The cryptonym chosen for CIA's concealment within its own
components was AESTORAGE. On one document, Tennent H. ("Pete") Bagley, *PK*
~~Chief of Soviet Russia Counter Intelligence~~, explains:

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collection of information provided by
several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE
information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of
CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI [i. e. Bagley himself].
AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has
been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

The Soviet Russia Division alone contained at least ten separate
entities (SR-1-10), not counting its separate Counter Intelligence capability. SR6 was
termed "Soviet Realities" and offered CIA staff a training course in how to navigate
life in the Soviet Union, from how to get a telephone installed in Moscow to how to
mail letters; to how to buy a bottle of whiskey. The SR division was entirely
independent of the New York CIA field office. SR had no field office anywhere; they
belonged entirely to headquarters at Langley.

As for secrecy, Bagley was so successful that it remained a secret
for years that Richard E. Snyder at the American embassy in Moscow, the supposed
consular official to whom Oswald attempted to relinquish his U. S. passport, was in
fact a CIA employee attached to the SR component. Who knew who was working
for whom? Only in February 1992 did an internal CIA document emerging from its
History Staff, reveal that Jim Garrison's suspect, Clay Shaw, was, as Jim Garrison
suspected, a "highly paid CIA contract source."

rewrite
Snyder had an "unofficial file"
in the SR division SR6 at a
time when he was a foreign service
officer

When Oswald the "defector" arrived in Moscow in October 1959 and encountered Richard Snyder, he was speaking not to a member of the foreign service, the State Department, but to an ~~employee of the Central Intelligence~~ *person with opaque connections*

to the Agency. Snyder's CIA handler was named "Norman Bradley," a pseudonym for Nelson Brickham, highly placed as Chief of the Soviet Russia, SR6 Soviet Realities section. Snyder had a top handler, but no official security approval. *✓ correct.*

Spotter Prior to his departure for Moscow, Snyder had been a CIA recruiter at Harvard University, where ostensibly he was studying the Russian language. Among those with whom Snyder had initiated contact for possible CIA employment was Zbigniew Brzezinski, years later to be President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser. *Print document in book*

CIA was delighted with its "spotter" Snyder's suggestion: Brzezinski was a person of "undoubted integrity and courage," and was "highly motivated in an anti-Soviet sense"; he knew "his Communism inside and out." CIA hesitated only because Brzezinski held passports from both Canada and Poland. It was the Alberto Fernandez dilemma: would the Agency be able to control him?

Yet another figure devoted to concealing CIA operations was Michael Mitchell, Chief of the Record Integration Division (RID). Mitchell created a complex records system, comprehensible only to those on the inside. In the 1960's, the RID was lodged ~~deep~~ within the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI). *DDI*

All the while CIA changed its cryptonyms. The names of its components were routinely altered. In 1975 when the Rockefeller Commission requested clarification of a list of cryptonyms, they were told by an assistant to the

Director of Central Intelligence that "the traffic and operations are so old we simply no longer have the break-outs for all of the code words employed at the time." He did remember that KWDIXIE was an "indicator used for air operations for [the] Bay of Pigs invasion."

Outworn jargon was discarded. Until 1950, paramilitary activities engaged in by the clandestine services were referred to as "preventive direct action." During a Cuban operation dubbed JMHOPE, David Atlee Phillips would confess, writing under his sometime pseudonym, "[MICHAEL] CHOADEN," "some meaningless code phrases were used on JMHOPE for psych reasons only, but on U. S. commercial stations."

CIA surveillance of the society at large was as thorough as the technology would allow. The Agency collected books and articles unsympathetic to their mission. The outreach went far deeper than that. A Research & Analysis member of the Counter Intelligence branch, Theodore C. Poling, notes as an aside in a document, "The NYT [New York Times] computer can be monitored."

For CIA, tapping into the "New York Times" computer meant business as usual. This document could also be read in another way: It could have been that CIA was given facilitated access to its computers by the "New York Times" itself.

CIA employees routinely concealed information from each other, so that in the 1970's Director of Central Intelligence William Colby complained that he had no idea what James Angleton was up to at the Counter Intelligence division. Angleton refused to pass information to CIA stations in the Arab countries unless

point
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NOBODY HAD
the first
clue
about
Angleton's
business

held the Israeli desk^u

"he felt like it." He handled all Israeli operations through contacts he had made during his OSS days in Italy. "The accepted clandestine services doctrine," long-time CIA officer Ray Cline reveals in his memoir, is that "no one outside their own ranks should be told anything operational."

III

There were sporadic attempts to create oversight over CIA. In 1954, "New York Times" writer Hanson Baldwin had suggested CIA oversight through a joint committee for "legislative supervision and protection." Nothing came of it.

Two years later, Senator Mike Mansfield proposed a watchdog committee over CIA. His proposal was defeated 56-27. Allen Dulles's view that an oversight committee was undesirable and unnecessary carried the day. Once or twice a year, Burton Hersch notes in "The Old Boys," Allen Dulles would appear before the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House.

In his customary tweeds, rimless spectacles perched upon his Anglo-Saxon nose, Dulles seemed more professorial than an enthusiast for murder and mayhem. "The Commies are still giving us a hard time?" a CIA friend in the crowd might inquire. If a Congressman dared to pursue the issue, Dulles had a ready answer.

"It's too dangerous for Congress to take up," Dulles said. This silenced even the most outspoken. Not only did Dulles come away with what soon amounted to billions of dollars, but no one dared request an accounting.

The Senate Armed Services Committee had been granted oversight authority over CIA. Over the years, the Committee was dominated by Senator

Richard Russell of Georgia. Lyndon Johnson had been a long-time Agency ally, serving on the subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency, the first Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence. Lyndon appointed Russell to its subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency. Russell, a long-time CIA ally, went on to ensure that CIA operations would be exempt from congressional oversight. Gerald Ford served the same function in the House.

After the Day of Pigs, Senator Eugene McCarthy again suggested “a Joint Senate-House Committee to keep a check on the CIA.” CIA has “assume[d] the roles of the President and the Congress,” McCarthy said, taking on “the character of an invisible government answering only to itself.”

McCarthy was ignored. He knew he wouldn’t be going anywhere with such a proposal. McCarthy remarked sardonically to his friend Richard Starnes, “I don’t mind CIA putting a domestic into my house, if only they put in a good one!”

In 1964, Lyndon Johnson appointed Richard Russell, Gerald Ford – and Allen Dulles – to serve on the Warren Commission.

Occasionally other congressional rebels surfaced. In 1976, Congressman Otis Pike, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, attempted to report on CIA. Pike was thwarted by the sudden disappearance of more than two hundred “Top Secret” and “Secret” documents that CIA had been compelled to turn over to his committee. So Pike learned from an aide to the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, the Ford-appointed George H. W. Bush.

The missing documents covered such subjects as “the Agency’s use of business firms for cover,” documents that would have exposed Bush himself as having lied about his CIA history. They chronicled the detailing of CIA personnel to other government agencies. The House voted not to release the panel’s final report.

As we have seen in the example of Richard Starnes, not quite everyone in the media fell under CIA control. CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr got his hands on the Pike report. But CBS, Schorr’s employer, forbade him from even mentioning it on the air. Schorr could find no outlet for these truths about CIA but the “Village Voice,” a New York alternate newspaper. His days at CBS were numbered.

Later, embittered former CIA employees came forward. Retired operative Paul Sakwa wrote an analysis of the clandestine services in which he acknowledged that CIA had created “procedures designed to prevent outside scrutiny.” Freedom from any oversight had led in CIA, Sakwa had concluded, to abuses and the pursuit of unnecessary political and paramilitary operations by the CIA. Even Sakwa did not draw the obvious conclusion that CIA’s operations had less to do with the issues at hand, and more with CIA enhancing its power and justifying its infinite budget.

In a searing paper, Sakwa wrote that the freedom from scrutiny had corrupted CIA from within:

Extreme security measures, overclassification of sensitive material and exaggerated use of compartmentation [sic] promote a kind of bureaucratic chauvinism and paranoia, which in turn complicate needed coordination in areas where divisional operations overlap. The aura of secrecy may induce an enjoyable conspiratorial flavor while, at the same time, it breeds a suspicious atmosphere where one only trusts, assigns and promotes one’s friends.

When oversight loomed, when operational details were blown, CIA has simply lied, or papered the file by creating documents. When it proved necessary, they shredded documents, as Richard Helms did for the CIA field office's files on Lee Harvey Oswald following the Kennedy assassination. Assisting was Hunter Leake, second in command at the New Orleans field office.

Presiding over the creation of new self-serving documents denying inconvenient realities was the Office of General Counsel. Lawrence Houston (Mr Fix it) assumed the frequent assignment of getting "CIA out of trouble after it had got into it." This meant papering the files.

CIA officers at the top of the chain were particularly skilled at lying under oath. On the rare occasions that he was challenged, Dulles simply lied. When he argued that the Executive Branch of government had endorsed a CIA operation, it was a lie since CIA clandestine operations were not authorized by anyone outside the Agency. nods & winks ? -

Among the most blatant of these lies, of course, was Dulles's insistence that the Bay of Pigs invasion was "not decided at the CIA level, but at each step by the executive branch of the government." Eisenhower and Kennedy and been briefed – after the fact.

On May 20, 1961 Dulles backtracked. He was sorry, he said, that he had "not re-allocated responsibility as between CIA and the Department of Defense." He should have established at least "the benign and moral blessing of the U. S. Government for the cause we are supporting." The "we" implies CIA's own

shadow government as opposed to the entirely separate "U.S. Government," as Dulles saw it.

Dulles even admitted in a June 1, 1961 memorandum directed to General Maxwell Taylor that his purpose in briefing President-elect John F. Kennedy on November 18, 1960 about the impending invasion of Cuba was "not to solicit the President-elect's approval or disapproval of the Cuba program, but merely to acquaint him of its existence." That rankled Dulles, having to brief not only a mere president, but one not yet in office.

Ted Shackley, now Deputy Director of Operations (once "Plans"), lied to House Select Committee investigator Gaeton Fonzi, insisting that the Miami CIA station, JMWAVE, had been "only interested in pursuing its intelligence-gathering and propaganda missions." As the story of Alberto Fernandez, among others, testifies, JMWAVE was deeply involved in operations of a paramilitary nature.

Another infamous CIA liar was Richard Helms, who had succeeded Richard Bissell as DD/P. Helms, famously, lied before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about CIA's participation in 1973 in the overthrow of the legal government of Salvador Allende in Chile. Helms had to concern himself with yet another realm of Helms's vulnerability. Helms was keeping the secret of CIA's earlier, unsuccessful effort to mount a military coup to prevent Allende from taking office in the first place.

Testifying in 1975, James Angleton brazenly lied to the Church Committee. "The Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination

department," Angleton insisted, knowing full well that assassination was a prerogative of the clandestine services from the days when it was called the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and those masters of covert killing, Dulles and Wisner were at the helm. Under long-time CIA officer, William Harvey, CIA's murder department was named "Executive Action."

Among Angleton's most choice lies to the Church committee was that Lee Harvey Oswald had not been debriefed upon his return from the Soviet Union. "Normally that would fall within the jurisdiction of the military, since he was a military man who defected...I am certain we never did, no," Angleton babbled.

Oswald had, in fact, been debriefed by the Soviet Russia division of CIA in New York City. The history of Oswald's foray into the Soviet Union, an operation of Angleton himself, reveals how CIA lied to its own components.

The Soviet Russia (SR) component of the clandestine services enjoyed its own methods of concealing information from other Agency components. Documents reveal that CIA employees, like the Chief of Soviet Realities, Thomas Casasin, remained unaware that Oswald had been placed in the Soviet Union by Angleton's Counter Intelligence. One document reveals that Casasin was puzzled by that strange figure Lee Harvey Oswald because he planned to recruit him himself.

Casasin (whose real name has never been released by CIA) had what he called "an operational interest in the Harvey story." He changed his mind about enlisting Oswald in "REDWOOD," a clandestine operation involving legal travelers to the Soviet Union, because of Oswald's "unusual behavior in the Soviet

Union." REDWOOD resided within the SR10 component, and solicited legal travelers, people who had a legitimate reason for being in the Soviet Union, like scientists. REDWOOD unfolded within the "SE division," connoting a geographic designator for the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe.

more crypted as
To obscure ~~the whole enterprise~~, REDWOOD was ^{operatives} also part of a program named AE/OCEAN referring to ~~field or desk information in crypt form~~.

disseminated through internal systems with an "action indicator." So convoluted was CIA's structure, making it virtually impossible even for its own employees to penetrate its dark corners, that SED itself was comprised of five entities: an Internal OPS; External OPS; a Counterintelligence Group; a Reports and Records Group; and a Support Branch.

any
It was on behalf of REDWOOD that Casasin considered enlisting Lee Harvey Oswald, ^{for SR10 OPS.} only to change his mind.

? ?
The historical irony is that REDWOOD featured an assassination program that Oswald avoided, only for him to be accused a few short years later of the assassination of the president. *? what?*

That CIA knew Oswald well is confirmed by a May 31, 1960 CIA cover sheet signed off on by ~~Jerry Brechen~~ ^{JP} at SR9, the Operations component of the Soviet Russia Division. Agency employees with no "need to know," like Casasin, would remain unaware that Oswald was debriefed by the SR component in ~~New York~~ in 1962 upon his return from Russia. When Casasin later testified under oath before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, CIA instructed him to withhold certain information. *? did they*

Oswald's debriefer in ~~New York~~ ^{research} went by the pseudonym of "Anderson." A deputy chief operating out of the SR6 section, "Anderson" was a woman named Eleanor Reed. Reed, in turn, was ~~responsible to the top man, David~~ ^{Reed} ~~Murphy, chief of the bloated Soviet Russia division.~~ Reed debriefed other returning "defectors" who had been part of Angleton's program, like Robert Webster. So although the report of Reed's debriefing of Oswald, witnessed by CIA employee Donald Deneselya, has not survived, the National Archives did release a document describing Reed's interview with Webster.

Dated August 10, 1962, titled, "REPORT OF COVERT ASSESSMENT," Reed's description of her interview with Webster reveals that her assignment was, in part, to explore whether "the person assessed becomes a staff employee." Since Webster's defection to the Soviet Union, obviously as a plant, a person whom the agency was considering as a permanent employee, so closely parallels Oswald's experience, the document serves as a mirror image of the missing Oswald report. It suggests that Oswald too was being considered, at a certain stage, for CIA employment. print document

Reed offers a "Personality Sketch" of Webster, "as he is now and as he should be in the future." Webster's test performance, Reed writes, "stands out most because of its seeming normality." She then describes a personality almost identical to the Warren Commission's later psychological assessment of Oswald. Webster emerges as a sociopath: "the philosophies and ideologies of persons and peoples that develop from a common core of emotion and purpose are foreign to

him; his inner voice cannot contribute to or take from these shared values, goals and feelings.”

When Webster was brought out of the Soviet Union by CIA, the Soviet Russia (SR6) division photographed every piece of paper he had in his possession, from bus tickets to match books. He was ordered, of course, never to admit to anyone that he had participated in a CIA counter intelligence program.

Webster was kept safe from the probing eyes of historians, but in the late 1990's that indefatigable author Dick Russell traveled to a remote nursing home to interview a now frail Webster.

Webster was inarticulate, Russell says, lost in himself. At only one moment did he emerge from his shell. When Russell asked Webster if he had known Marina Oswald in the Soviet Union, Webster nodded his assent. If this is not hard evidence, it does suggest that Webster and Oswald, serving in the same CIA program, had encountered each other in Russia.

Those with the need to know about CIA's June 1962 debriefing of Oswald included E. M. Ashcraft, who ~~has already appeared in this narrative as the~~ ^{GO/CD} ~~contact of Col. Sam Kail;~~ and Robert Crowley, of the Operational Support Branch of ~~Counter Intelligence~~. In the loop as well was Rudy Balaban, out of SR6,

Research. Code name "Valentino," Balaban would have consulted with Reed as she did her debriefings. — *Balaban was chief of SR6 Research*

As for the trajectory of Oswald's debriefing, Reed would have had to be in touch with the Office of Security, requesting ~~its~~ permission. ~~The Office~~ of Security would then have passed Reed's request on to the Personnel Security

Division. Watching over the entire effort would have been the Special Investigations Group (SIG), whose first purpose was to investigate possibilities that CIA had been penetrated by the KGB.

SIG's chiefs reported directly to James Angleton, a detail that in itself confirms that Angleton lied to the Church Committee when he insisted that Oswald had not been debriefed by CIA. The Special Investigations Group was one to which most agency people were denied access, but Angleton wasn't one of them. Over the years, only one Director of Central Intelligence enjoyed Angleton's confidence, and that was his long-time counterpart, Allen Dulles.

Another of CIA's strategies for avoiding oversight was its infiltration of its agents into investigations where CIA's role might be thrust into the light. So CIA appointed George Joannides, an officer in the clandestine services, to be the liaison between CIA and the House Select Committee On Assassinations. Until writer Jefferson Morley exposed the connection, CIA was able to conceal that Joannides had been among the handlers for the anti-Castro group DRE (*Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil*) in Miami. Joannides was participating in an investigation of events in which he had played a role.

CIA revisited the same ploy in the late 1990's. Russell Holmes, the CIA officer responsible for managing JFK assassination records during that same HSCA investigation, and for handling Freedom of Information requests, appeared one day at the headquarters of the Assassination Records Review Board. Holmes said he wished to apply for a job with the review board.

The resume that he dropped off revealed that Holmes had worked for CIA as a senior counter-intelligence specialist from 03 December 1951 to 12 January 1979, a healthy tenure. In 1979 he was a recipient of the Agency's Intelligence Medal of Merit. Admitting to no conflict of interest in his application to the ARRB, Holmes declared that he accepted "CIA's version of events." He believed that "the records reveal no hidden mysteries."

To tantalize the ARRB, Holmes confided that the Office of Security had a pre-assassination file on Oswald. There was also a "soft file," dating from before the assassination and residing at the Counter Intelligence Special Investigation Group (CI/SIG). Holmes also talked about an HTLINGUAL file outlining CIA's domestic operation opening the mail of American citizens. Despite these inducements, AARB chose not to hire Russ Holmes.

There have been moments when CIA's operations have come to light. In 1973 and 1974, Directors of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger and William Colby reviewed six hundred and ninety-three CIA violations of "internal directives." These came to be known as the "Family Jewels." As one CIA asset told the author, Colby's "limited hangout with the family jewels before Congress was earnest, but still smelled like the serial murderer who will readily confess to a couple of robberies."

Long-time CIA officers were appalled that CIA should apologize for anything, and one former chief of station called Colby a "goddamn Jesuit." It was now that those aforementioned two hundred documents earmarked for Church committee scrutiny vanished. The Church committee exposed how the

clandestine services had achieved "an institutional independence that was unimaginable at the time of its inception." Only fourteen percent of covert actions initiated by the clandestine services, had been approved by Congress or the President."

(Turner fired 800 CS offices)

Following the revelations of the Church committee, CIA stock was low. In 1978, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner even hired a New York marketing research firm to conduct focus groups among college students. The task was to refine a discredited CIA's recruitment process and attract employees.

By 1982, CIA was doing business as usual, and Iran Contra loomed. As Tim Weiner points out, CIA under William Casey, in its efforts to fund the Contras and topple the Sandinistas, helped themselves to hundreds of millions of dollars, reaching a budget of three billion. The Navy, once more resisting CIA domination, again raised an objection.

Casey had made the error of appointing Vice Admiral Bobby Ray Inman as Deputy Director. Inman resigned. "I caught him lying to me in a number of cases," Inman said of his boss. No President even dared challenge CIA power, and President Reagan lied to protect the covert operations of CIA.

Iran Contra was the occasion for CIA to utilize a worldwide network of independent companies, including airlines, aviation and military spare parts suppliers and trading companies, to ship illegally arms and military spare parts. These companies were set up with the approval of senior CIA officials and staffed largely by ex-CIA, ex-FBI and ex-military officers, working for a common cause.

Among the companies were "Aero Systems, Inc. of Miami; Air America; Merex International Arms of Savannah, Georgia.

The list is long, the model of CIA in a symbiotic relationship with defense-contractors and other corporations as old as the Agency itself. Like the clandestine services themselves, the names and covers of these CIA-sponsored companies change: Merex could be found under "Combat Military Ordinances Ltd, for example. Or CIA created dummy corporations, with names like "Basic Resources." Specious CIA-connected contractors sprang up all over the country, providing "surveillance services for the U. S. spy agencies," and hiding behind names like "Science Applications International Corporation of San Diego."

Iran Contra in the early 1980's represented yet another pivotal moment in CIA's growing accession to power. CIA forged a "gentleman's agreement" with the Department of Justice to look the other way, so that, as Gary Webb puts it in his book, "Dark Alliance," crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency "no longer needed to be reported to the Justice Department." Drug offenses were among the crimes CIA was not required to report.

CIA could take the high road and assert that "CIA did not want to be involved in law enforcement issues." Webb concluded that CIA's "crimes of state" would continue "until the American public and its Congressional representatives regain control of the CIA." His error was in the use of the word "regain." No one had ever had such control over this agency.

Vice-president George H. W. Bush chose as his National Security Adviser Donald P. Gregg, who had been employed by CIA for more than thirty

years; Gregg had worked in operations disrupting the electoral efforts of Japan's Marxist parties in a reprise of Operation GLADIO.

By the late 1980's, CIA was already spending \$700 million in Afghanistan.

Rare, isolated voices continued to raise objections to CIA's steady rise to power. Senator Wayne Morse, among others, had objected that CIA "determines a great deal of policy," and Angleton had admitted as much. "It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government," Angleton had remarked. That at least was no lie.